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HEouse of Lords.
ST. HIELEN'S SMELTING COMPANY v. TIPPING.
A. brought an action against a smelting company for injuring his trees and shrubs
by noxious vapors, and the learned judge, at the trial, directed the jury to find for
the plaintiff, if the evidence satisfied them that real, sensible injury had ben done
to the enjoyment or value of A.'s property by such vapors. The jury found for
the plaintiff: Hdd, that the learned judge had rightly directed the jury, and that
the defendants were liable for sensible injury done to the plaintiff's property, notwithstanding that their business was an ordinary business, carried on in a proper
manner, and in a neighborhood more or less devoted to manufacturing purposes.

Tins was an appeal from a decision of the Court of Exchequer
Chamber (reported 4 B. & S. 616), affirming a judgment of the
Court of Queen's Bench (reported Id. 408), whereby- the court
refused a rule for a new trial.
In June 1860, Mr. Tipping purchased an estate of considerable
value in the county of Lancaster, and in September of that year
extensive smelting operations were commenced by the defendants
at works within a mile and a half of the plaintiff's property. In
May 1863, Mr. Tipping brought his action in the Court of Queen's
Bench against the defendants. The declaration alleged that the
plaintiff was possessed of a certain dwelling-house and premises,
with garden, &c., adjoining, and was also entitled to the reversion
of certain lands near to the said dwelling-house, in the possession
of his tenants ; that the defendants erected and used certain smelting works upon land near to the said dwelling-house and lands of
the plaintiff, and caused large quantities of noxious gases, vapors,
&c., to issue from the said works, and to diffuse themselves over
the said land and premises of the plaintiff, whereby the hedges,
trees, &c., were greatly injured, the cattle rendered unhealthy,
and the plaintiff was prevented from having so beneficial a use of
the said premises as he would otherwise have enjoyed, and also
that the reversionary lands and premises were depreciated in value.
The defendants pleaded not guilty, and issue was joined on tho
plea, and the cause was tried before MELLOR, J., at Liverpool, in
August 1863.
At the trial it was clearly proved that the effect of the vapors
exhaling from the works of the. defendants was very injurious to
the plaintiff's property.
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The learned judge directed the jury to the following effect :" A man may do any act on his own land which is not unlawful; when I say unlawful, I mean any act which is not wrong;
he may erect a lime-kiln if it is in a convenient place ; but the
meaning of the word ' convenient' is, that it must be plain that he
will not do an actionable injury to another; because a man may
not use his own property so as to injure his neighbor. When he
sends on the property of his neighbor noxious smells, smokes, &c.,
then he is not doing. an act on his own property only, but he is
doing an act on his neighbor's property also; because every man,
by common law, has a right to the pure air, and to have no noxious
smells sent on his land, unless, by a period of time, a man has, by
what is called a prescriptive right, obtained the power of throwing a burthen on his neighbor's property. But here you have no
prescriptive right at all. You are to consider this as if done quite
recently, and therefore you are not embarrassed by any consideration of that sort. Now, that being the case, I tell you that if a
man by an act, either by the erection of a lime-kiln, or copper
works, or any works of that description, sends over his neighbor's
land that which is noxious and hurtful to an extent which sensibly
diminishes the comfort and value of the property, and the comfort
of existence on that property, that is an actionable injury. That
is the law. But when you come to the question of facts, there is
no doubt you must take into consideration a variety of circumstances. In deciding whether or not a man's property has been
sensibly injured by the actions of another person on his own land,
of course you will consider the place, the circumstances, and the
whole nature of the thing. It would not be sufficient merely to
say that noxious vapors have come on the man's property, but
you must consider to what degree and to what extent they have
come, and whether they have come from the premises of the
defendants. Now, with respect to that, I do not think I can lay
it down in better words than I find expressed in a note to a very
admirable book, 'Whether a nuisance has been caused by the
defendants at all, the nature of the locality to work, and every
other fact in the case must be taken into consideration;' and so
ERL-E, 0. J., says in a case which has been handed up to me:
'The time, the locality, and so on, are all circumstances to be
taken into consideration, upon the question of fact whether an
actionable injury has been occasioned by a man to his neighbor or
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not.' You must apply your common sense to the question on the
one side, and on the other. The defendants say, ' If you do not
mind you will stop the progress of works of this description.' I
agree th'at that is so, because, no doubt, in the county of Lancaster, above all other counties, where great works have been created
and carried on-works which are the means for develop;ng the
national wealth-you must not stand on extreme rights, and allow
a person to say, ' I will bring an action against you for this, and
that, and so on.' Business could not go on if that were so.
Everything must be looked at from a reasonable point of view;
therefore, the law does not regard trifling and small inconveniences,
but only regards sensible inconveniences-injuries which sensibly
diminish the comfort, enjoyment, or value of the property which
is affected. Therefore, you see there are two questions here, and
no doubt they are questions of some difficulty. At the same time,
when you come to a review of the facts, it will be for you to say
whether or not the plaintiff has satisfied you that there have been
sent out from the defendants' works noxious vapors which have
affected his trees and shrubs. If they have sensibly affected his
trees and shrubs, and if they come from the defendants' works,
they do tend to diminish the real comfort and enjoyment of the
estate ; because if a man has got a fine estate and gardens and
plantations, and noxious vapors are sent from neighboring works
on his trees and shrubs do as to injure them, it is perfectly clear
that it is an actionable injury, because it affects the enjoyment
and comfort of a place which a man has created for his own enjoyment. The defendants' case is, that the district in which the
plaintiff lives is almost without a living tree, and the hedges are
universally blackened and destroyed. In point of fact, there is
no doubt that the effect of the manufactories throughout the district is entirely destructive to vegetation. However, looking at
the evidence on both sides, taking those considerations into view
which I have alluded to, I ask you has the plaintiff satisfied you
that the effect of'the noxious vapors, to a sensible extent, can be
traced to have come from the defendants' works to the plaintiff's
property, and to have injured it ? This is a case in which the
burthen of proof rests on the plaintiff. Consider all the circumstances, and apply your own experience to the evidence which has
been given, and then say, has the plaintiff satisfied you that a
reai, seasible injury has been done to the enjoyment of his pro-
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perty, or the value of it by reason of the noxious vapors which
have been sent forth from the defendants' works ? If that is made
out to your satisfaction, you will find for the plaintiff; if not, then
you will find for the defendants."
The jury intimated that they found a verdict for the plaintiff.
The learned judge, at the request of the defendants' counsel,
put the following questions to the jury:Q. 1. Was the enjoyment of the plaintiff's property sensibly
diminished ?-A. We think so.
Q. 2. Do you consider the business there carried on to be an
ordinary business for smelting copper ?-A. We consider it an
ordinary business, and carried on in a proper manner; in as good
a manner as possible.
Q. 3. Do you consider, supposing that makes any difference,
that it was carried on in a proper place ?-A. Well, no, we do not.
The jury then found a verdict for the plaintiff, damages 3611.
18s. 4d.
In Michaelmas Term, 1863, a motion was made for a rule to
show cause why the verdict found for the plaintiff should not be
set aside, and a new trial had between the parties; this rule was
refused by the Court of Queen's Bench.
The defendants then appealed to the Court of Exchequer Chamber, who affirmed the judgment of the court below.
The defendants now appealed to the House of Lords.
The following learned judges were present at the hearing:
BLACKBURN, SIIEE, WILLES, and KEATING, JJ., and 'MARTIN and
PIGOTT, EB.
Sir B. Palmer, A. G., and Vebster, Q. C., for the appellants,
contended that the learned judge who tried the action had misdirected the jury, inasmuch as sensible discomfort from carrying
on a necessary trade, in an ordinary and proper manner, and in a
convenient or suitable locality, was not an actionable injury..
They referred to Hole v. Barlow, 27 L. J., C. P. 207 ; 6 Weekly
Rep. 619 ; Bainford v. Turnley, 3 B. & S. 62, 66 ; Carey.v. Ledbitter, 13 C. B., N. S. 470 ; WTanstead v. Hill, Id. 479; Stockport v. -Potter,7 H. & Norm. 160; and Com. Dig., Action on the
Case for Nuisance, C.
3Iellish, Q. C., Brett, Q. C., and Milward, Q. C., for the
respondent, were not called upon. At the conclusi6n of the
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argument for the appellants, the following question was submitted
by their lordships to the learned judges:"Were the directions given by the learned judge at Nisi Prius
to the jury correct, or ought a new trial to be granted ?"
B.-In answer to the questions proposed by your
to
the judges, I have to state their unanimous opinion,
lordships
that the directions given by the learned judge to the jury are correct, and that a new trial ought not to be granted. As far as
the experience of us all goes, the directions are such as we have
given in these cases for the last twenty years.
MARTIN,

LoRD CHANCELLOR (Lord WESTBURY).-I think your lordships
will be satisfied with the answer we have received from the learned
judges, to the question put by the House. In matters of this
description, it appears to me that it is a very desirable thing to
mark the difference between an action brought for a nuisance,
upon the ground that the alleged nuisance produces material
injury to the property, and an action brought for a nuisance, on
the ground that the thing alleged to be a nuisance .is productive
of sensible personal discomfort. With regard to the latter, namely,
the personal inconvenience and interference with one's enjoyment,
one's quiet, one's personal freedom-anything that discomposes or
injuriously affects the senses or the nerves-whether that may or
may not be denominated a nuisance, must undoubtedly depend
greatly on the circumstance where the thing complained of actually
occurs. If a man lives in a town, of necessity he should submit
himself to the consequence of those obligations of trade which
may be carried on in his immediate locality, which are actually
necessary for trade and commerce, also for the enjoyment of pro
perty, and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town and of
the public at large. If a man lives in a street where there are
numerous shops, and a shop is opened next door to him, which is
carried on in a fair and reasonable way, he has no ground for
,complaint, because to himself individually there may arise much
discomfort from the trade carried on in that shop; but when an
occupation is carried on by one person in the neighborhood of
another, and the result of that trade, or occupation, or business is
material injury, then, unquestionably, arises a very different consideration; and I think that, in a case of that description, the
submission which is required from persons living in society, to
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that amount of discomfort which may be necessary for the legitimate and free exercise of the trade of their neighbors, would not
apply to circumstances, the immediate result of which is sensible
injury to the value of the property.
Now, in the present case, it appears that the plaintiff purchased
a very valuable estate, which lies within a mile and a half from
large smelting works. What the occupation of these coppersmelting premises were, anterior to the year 1860, does not clearly
appear. The plaintiff became the proprietor of an estate of great
value in the month of June 1860. In the month of September
1860, very extensive smelting operations began on the property
of the present appellants-the works at St. Helen's. Of the
effect of the vapors exhaling from those works upon the plaintiff's
property, and the injury done to the trees and shrubs, there is
abundance of evidence ; the action has been brought for that; the
jury have found the existence of the injury, and the only ground
upon which your lordships are asked to set aside that verdict, and
to direct a new trial, is this: that the whole neighborhood where
these copper-smelting works are carried on, is a neighborhood
more or less devoted to manufacturing purposes; and therefore it
is said, that inasmuch as this copper smelting is carried on in
what the appellant contends is a fit place, it may be carried on
with impunity, although the result may be the utter destruction
of the value of the plaintiff's property. I apprehend that that is
not the meaning of the word "1suitable," or the meaning of the
word "1convenient," when the law is laid down on the subject.
The word "suitable" unquestionably cannot carry with it this
consequence-that -a trade may be carried on in a particular
locality, the consequence of which trade may be injury and
destruction to the neighboring property. Of course I except the
cases where any prescriptive right has been acquired by a lengthened use of the place. On these grounds, therefore, shortly, without dilating further upon them, as they are sufficiently unfolded
by the judgment of the learned judges in the court below, I advise
your lordships to affirm the decision of the court below, and to.
refuse this appeal, and to refuse it with costs.
LonD CPANWORTH.-I entirely agree with my noble and learned
friend, and also in the opinion expressed by the judges, that this
has been considered to be the proper mode of directing a jury, as
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Mr. Baron MARTIN said, for the last twenty years; I believe I
should have carried it back rather further. I have always understood that the proper question was, and I cannot do better than
adopt the language of Mr. Justice MELLOR: "It must be plain
that persons using a lime-kiln, or other works which emit noxious
vapors, may not do an actionable injury to another; and that that
place where it is carried on so that it does occasion an actionable
injury to another, is not, in the meaning of the law, a convenient
place." I always understood that to be so ; but, in truth, as was
observed in one of the cases by the learned judges, it is extremely
difficult to lay down any actual definition of what constitutes an
injury, because it is always a question of compound fact which
must be looked to, to see whether or not the mode of carrying it
on did or did not occasion so serious an injury as to interfere with
the comforts of life and enjoyment of property. I perfectly well
remember, when I had the honor of being one of the barons of the
Court of Exchequer, trying a case in the county of Durham, where
there was an action for smoke in the town of Shields. It was
proved incontestably that smoke did come, and in some degree
interfered with a certain person, but I said, "You must look at it,
not with a view to the question whether, abstractedly, that quantity of smoke was a nuisance, but whether it was a nuisance ta
the person living in the town of Shields," because if it only added
in an infinitesimal degree to the quantity of the smoke, I thought
that the state of the town rendered it altogether impossible to call
that a nuisance. There is nothing of that sort in the present
case; it seems to me that the distinction, in matter of fact, was
most correctly pointed out by Mr. Justice MELLOn, and I do not
think he could possibly have stated the law, either abstractedly or
with reference to the facts, better than he has done in this case.
LORD WENSLEYDALE.-I entirely agree in opinion with both
my noble and learned friends in this case. In these few sentences
I think everythiiig is included: "The defendants say, if you do
not mind you will stop the progress of works of this description
I agree that that is so, because, no doubt, in the county of Lancaster, above all other counties, where great works have been
created and carried on-works which are the means of developing the national wealth, you must not stand on extreme right, and
allow a person to say, I I will bring an action against you for this
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or that, and so on.' Business could not go on if that were so.
Everything must be looked to from a reasonable point of view ;
therefore the law does not regard trifling or small inconveniences,
but only regards sensible inconveniences which sensibly diminish
the comfort, enjoyment, or value of the property which is affected."
I do not think that the'question could have een more correctly
laid down by any one to the jury, and I entirely concur in the
propriety of dismissing this appeal.
Appeal dismissed, with costs.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
COURT OF CLAIMS.
THE Supreme Court of the United States, at its last Term,
decided that it could not entertain appeals from the Court of
Claims, and that the Act of Congress of March 3d 1863, c. 92,
so far as it provided for such appeals, was unconstitutional.
As the opinion of the majority of the court, delivered by the
Chief Justice, is very brief, it is annexed entire :"Supreme Court of the United States.
"No. 160. March 10th 1865.
"DAVID GORDON and SARAn GORDON, Administrators of DAVID
" FISHER, Appellants, v. The UNITED STATES.
"Opinion of Chief Justice CHASE.
"The court has duly considered the able and instructive opinion of counsel upon the question of jurisdiction which presents
itself at the threshold of this cause, and has found itself constrained to the conclusion that, under the Constitution, it can
exercise no appellant jurisdiction over the decisions of tlhe Court
of Claims.
"We think that the authority given to the head of an executive
department by necessary implication, in the 14th section of the
amended Court of Claims Act, to revise all the decisions of this
Court requiring the payment of money, denies to it the judicial
power from the exercise of which appeals can be taken to this
court.
" The reasons which necessitate this conclusion may be more
fully announced hereafter. At present we restrict ourselves to
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this general statement, and to the direction that the case be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
" Justices MILL-ER and FIELD dissented."'
We annex, also, all of the statute that relates to the action of
the Secretary of the Treasury, including the 14th section, on
,which the court rests its decision:" SECTION 7.-Ahd be it further enacted, that in all cases of
final judgments by said court, or on appeal by the said Supreme
Court, where the same shall be affirmed in favor of the claimant;
the sum due thereby shall be paid out of any general appropriation made by law for the payment and satisfaction of private
claims, on presentation, to the Secretary of the Treasury, of a
copy of said judgment, certified by the clerk of said Court of
Claims, and signed by the chief justice, or, in his absence, by
the presiding judge of said court. And in cases where the judgment appealed from is in favor of said claimant, or the same is
affirmed by the said Supreme Court, interest thereon, at the rate
of five per centum, shall be allowed from the date of its presentation to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment as aforesaid,
but no interest shall be allowed subsequent to the affirmance unless
presented for payment to the Secretary of ihe Treasury as aforesaid: Provided, That no interest shall be allowed on any claim
up to the time of the rendition- of the judgment by said Court of
Claims, unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for the payment of interest; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of
the Treasury, at the commencement of each Congress, to include
in his report a statement of all sums paid at the Treasury on such
judgments, together with the names of the parties in whose favor
the same were allowed."
" SECTION 14.-And be it further enacted, that no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury for any claims passed upon by the
Court of Claims till after an appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the.Secretary of the Treasury."
In terms, the decision of the Supreme Court is, that by necessary implication from the 14th section, the Secretary of the
Treasury is "to revise all the decisions of the Court of Claims
requiring the payment of money." But in effect it is that, by
The report of the case in 2 Wallace 561 does not give the opinion above cited,
but only tho decision made.
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the statute as enacted, the decisions of the Court of Claims,
including those affirmed by the Supreme Court, are (by such
necessary implication) to be reviewed by the Secretary, and
sanctioned, altered, or annulled by him, so that the final adjudication of claims shall be by the Secretary, and his judgments, and
not those of the judicial tribunals, be the things to be paid.
The proposition is extreme. It is the function of the Supreme
Court to declare the law, and thereby in all matters of a judicial
nature to control the actions of the other branches of the government. And that its decisions in matters purely judicial should be
submitted to an executive officer for his sanction or correction, is
an unprecedented legislative intent, inconsistent with the consti
tutional functions and relations of the different branches of the
government, and not to be imputed to Congress on anything less
than-a "1 necessary implication."
What the intention of the legislature was in enacting the 14th
section, is indicated by the debate upon it in the Senate, where it
originated. It made no part of the original bill, but was moved
as an amendment to it by Mr. Hale, Senator from New Hampshire, who said:"Let me explain this amendment. It does not require a
specific appropriation, but it simply requires a general appropriation, the meaning of which is that if the Court of Claims passes
on a large claim, there shall be a session of Congress intervene
before it is paid, so that Congress may know what they appropriate
for, and that the Secretary may know how much to estimate for."'
And the section was adopted without further debate on it.
On this explanation, the purpose of the 14th section was to
change the time, but not the nature, of the Secretary's action.
The procedure contemplated by the original bill was that the Secretary, on the presentation of the judgments to him, should pay
them, as they were certified to him, out of "any general appropriation made by law for the payment and satisfaction of private
claims." But on the amendment; as explained by its mover, the
procedure contemplated was that the Secretary should pay the
judgments, as they were certified to him, out of a general appropriation, after they had been presented to him and by him c estimated for" to Congress. And this legislative intent would seem
to be the intent of the statute, and the precise effect of the 7th
VOL. XIV.-8
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section as amended by the 14th, if both are construed according
to the ordinary meaning of their words.
The 7th section provides that the Secretary shall pay the judgments certified to him on their "presentation" to him, while the
14th section prohibits his payment of them " till after an appropriation therefor has been estimated for" by him. The latter of
these provisions is repugnant to the former and repeals it, and, as
an amendment, is substituted for it. But the repeal is no broader
than the positive repugnance, and the other provisions of the 7th
section remain in force. These specify, as the fund from which
the judgments are to be paid, a general appropriation for the payment of private claims. Whether an appropriation is general-or
specific does not depend on the estimate made by the Secretary,
but only on the terms of the Act of Congress making the appropriation, and these terms Congress may shape as it pleases. It
may, therefore, make an appropriation general in its terms on
estimates from the Secretary specifying particular claims. So
that, in the words of Mr. Hale, the 14th section " does not require
a specific appropriation," and is not repugnant therefore to the
provision of the 7th section, and does not repeal it. And then,
as the statute in its 7th section specifies a general appropriation
and nowhere specifies any other, the 14th section must be construed to refer to a general appropriation. And the 7th section
also provides that the Secretary shall pay on the judgments certified to him 1 the sum due thereby," which can only be the dollars and cents specified in them. So that he is to pay the judgments as they are certified to him.
Then the only action by the Secretary recognised by the 14th
section, in the ordinary meaning of its terms, is that he should
make an estimate for an appropriation. To estimate is to calcu.
late that which cannot be precisely determined; and an estimate
for an appropriation,is the legislative phrase for the Secretary's
official report of his calculation of the amount required for a
specific expenditure. And, so construed, the terms of the 14th
section are appropriate to the circumstances in which the Secretary is to act. For his estimates would include judgments which
by the provisions of the 7th section carry interest from the date
of their presentation to him until they are paid. And as the
Secretary could not know, when making his estimate, what inter-
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est would accrue thereafter on those judgments, he could not then
know or state the precise amount required for an appropriation;
and all he could do would be to calculate or estimate for an appropriation according to the terms of the 14th section and his usual
and proper official action.
If the 7th and 14th sections may be construed and executed
together, according to the above exposition of them, then the im
plication of the Supreme Court is not " a necessary implication."
And the decision of the Supreme Court would seem to conflict
with settled rules of construction.
Where, of two constructions of part of a statute, one is consistent and the other is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute,
the rule is that the former shall be adopted and the latter be discarded. Apart from the 14th section, the plain purpose of the
statute is that the final settlement of claims shall be on the
decisions of the Court of Claims, subject to the appeal given to
the Supreme Court. And the 14th section is consistent with
such purpose, and aids in it, if it is construed according to the
ordinary meaning of its words, to require only an estimate.
Whereas, if the 14th section is construed according to the
decision of the Supreme Court to require a revision of the cases
by the Secretary, it defeats such purpose of the statute, and its
terms are strained beyond their ordinary and their proper meaning; for, to estimate is not to adjudicate, and " an appropriation
estimated for" is not the judicial determination of suits at law
between litigants.
And another rule of construction is that the sections of a statute
shall be so construed as to be consistent with each other. And it
is a necessary consequence, or corollary of this rule, that where
two sections of a statute, when construed according to the ordinary meaning of their terms, are sensible and consistent with each
other, so that both may be executed without conflict between them
they cannot be made repugnant to each other by mere implication
or construction beyond the ordinary meaning of their terms. N~ow,
it has been said that the 7th section provides that the Secretary
shall pay, on the judgments certified to him, "the sum due
thereby," which can only be the dollars and cents specified in the
judgments. Under this provision of the 7th section there could
be no alteration of the judgments by the Secretary, and consequently no revision of them by him. And with this provision of
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the 7th section, the 14th section is consistent and sensible, if it is
construed according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, to
require only an estimate by the Secretary. Whereas if the 14th
section is construed according to the decision of the Supreme
Court to require a revision of the cases by the Secretary, it is by
implication or construction beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms made repugnant to the provision of the 7th section, and to
repeal it. And this seems to be contrary to the rule of construction and its corollary above stated.
And there would seem to be this practical objection to the
decision of the Supreme Court, that the Secretary has no means
of making the revision which the debision requires of him. He
has no power in relation to the judgments of the Court of Claims
but what the statute gives him, and all that gives him is a certified copy of the judgment. This tells him the amount to be
paid and to whom it is due, and enables him to make an estimate
for an appropriation, and to pay the judgment-debt. / But he has
not the records of the cases nor their pleadings or evidence.
These are in the official custody of others, and he cannot command them. He has therefore neither the facts nor the law of the
cases nor any means of obtaining them, and, without them, his
revision of the judgments certified to him is impossible.
And if, as the Supreme Court has decided, the statute authorizes
the Secretary to revise the decisions of the judicial tribunals and
substitute his own, it does not authorize him to pay the judgments
he renders; for the only authority the statute gives him for making any payments whatever of the claims litigated, is contained
in the provisions of the 7th section, and is by express specification confined to "all cases of final judgments by said Court (of
Claims) or on appeal by the said Supreme Court," &c. And on
these judgments he is to pay "the sum due thereby." An authority so specific cannot be extended to other judgments or other
sums. And thus the implication -of the Supreme Court would
seem to prevent the payment and discharge of claims under the
statute, for which that was enacted and for which its 7th section
provides in express terms.
And if the Supreme Court are correct in their construction of
the -4th section, viz., that the Secretary is not merely to estimate
for, but is " to revise," i. e. to review, the decisions certified to
him, yet the conclusion of the court would seem to be unauthorized.

AND THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

The only ground of the Supreme Court's opinion is that the
Secretary is "to revise all the decisions of the Court of Claims
requiring the payment of money," and this would seem not to be so.
The only question here is as to cases appealed, for cases not
appealed never come within the action of the Supreme Court, and
are not within the scope of its opinion; and the provisions of the
statute as to these cannot affect the question as to cases appealed.
And in cases appealed, the decisions of the Court of Claims
cannot be revised by the Secretary, for they do not go to him;
they go the Supreme Court to be revised there, and whether they
are modified or affirmed there, it is the action of the Supreme
Court, superseding and taking the place of the action of the Court
of Claims, which gives to the judgment certified to the Secretary
all its legal effect. It is, therefore, the decision of the Supreme
Court that goes to him and which he is to revise, if he is to revise
anything. And it must appear to be the decision of the Supreme
Court to inform the Secretary that interest accrues on the amount
adjudged due and to authorize him to pay interest, for that only
accrues in the cases appealed to and decided by the Supreme
Court. The result would seem to be that, in cases appealed, the
Secretary does not revise the decisions of the Court of Claims,
and that the opinion of the Supreme Court rested on a mere mistake of fact.
The facts are, that, in cases appealed, the decision of the Supreme Court is certified to the Secretary in the form of a judgment and by the Court of Claims. But the opinion of the Supreme
Court does not say that the Secretary is to revise the judgments
of the Court of Claims, and, if it did, it would be unsubstantial
and impotent, for the formal judgment is only the evidence of the
decision it authenticates, and it is the decision in a case adjudged
that is revised when the case is reviewed. And the Supreme
Court must have meant exactly what its opinion expresses when
it uses the word "1decisions," instead of the word judgments,
viz., that the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, by the
Court of Claims, were to be revised and reviewed by the Secretary ; for this was necessary to the force of their argument, which
otherwise would be only this, viz., that the judicial character of
the Court of Claims was destroyed, and the right of appeal was
taken away by the provisions of the statute, that, after the
Supreme Court had acted on the appeal, its decision should be
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revised by the Secretary, on being certified to him, by the Court
of Claims, in the form of a judgment.
Nor can it be said that, in a case appealed, the final decision
that goes to the Secretary is to be taken as the decision of the
Court of Claims, because it is to be certified to him as the judg.
19nent of the Court of Claims; for it is not to be so certified to him.
The statute itself distinguishes between judgments of the Court
of Claims and judgments of the Court of Claims affirmed by the
Supreme Court, and not only in terms, but practically; for the
latter carry interest, and the former do not. And interest accrues
on the latter, not by the authority or force of the judgment certified to the Secretary, but only by force of the statute which he is
to execute. He therefore must always know that the judgment
certified to him is not the judgment of the Court of Claims, and
is the judgment of the Court of Claims affirmed by the Supreme
Court; and the only means for this knowledge, that the statute
gives him, is the certificate made to him; For this the statute
prescribes no form of words, but it must state the truth, and the
precise truth, and it must not state an untruth which would mislead the Secretary in the action the statute prescribes to him.
And therefore it cannot certify, as a judgment of the Court of
Claims, that which is in fact a judgment of the Court of Claims
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
l
If, in cases appealed, " the
decisions of the Court of Claims"
do not go to, and are not revised by, the Secretary, then the opinion of the Supreme Court falls with the mistake of fact it is rested
upon.
And if, in cases appealed, it is the decisions of the Supreme
Court which go to the Secretary, as the case before it was of that
class, the only question it raised was as to the effect of the 14th
section in providing that the decisions of the Supreme Court
should be revised by the Secretary. And in this respect the
14th section (as construed by the court) was unconstitutional,
because it subjected the Supreme Cour t to an appellant tribunal,
and that not judicial. And the effect of this would seem to be
that the 14th section, being unconstitutional in its action on the
Supreme Court, was as to that a nullity and merely void, and
that therefore the Supreme Court was to administer the statute in
cases appealed to it, as if the 14th section had not been enacted.
The argument of the Supreme Court would seem to be in sub
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stance this: The authority of the Secretary to revise the decisions
of the Court of Claims denies to that court judicial power or
character, and reduces it to a mere board of commissioners, and
therefore the appeal to this court cannot be sustained. This is
like the argument used for the decision of the case of The United
States v. Ferreira,13 How. 40. But that case would seem to
be the reverse of this. There the question was as to an appeal
from a commissioner to the Supreme Court; -while here the ques
tion is as to an appeal from the Supreme Court to a commissioner.
For, on the construction of the 14th section by the Supreme Court,
the Secretary is to act as a commissioner, and not officially.
To sum up our remarks, we say:1st. That the Secretary is not to revise any of the decisions
certified to him.
2d. That, in cases appealed, he is not to revise the decisions
of the Court of Claims.
3d. That if, in cases appealed, he is to revise the decisions of
the Supreme Court, the provision for that is unconstitutional and
of no legal effect.
If either of these propositions is correct, the decision of the
Supreme Court would seem to be erroneous. And if it is not
erroneous it establishes this proposition: that the authority of the
Secretary to revise the decisions of the Supreme Court denies
judicial power to the Court of Claims.
The construction of the 14th section, on which the court rests
its decision, was not suggested to the learned counsel in the case
by the statute itself nor by the court, and therefore was not argued
at the bar; and as two of the justices dissented and two others were
absent, the decision was in fact made by a majority of one, in the
nine members of the court. These circumstances, and the fact
that only the conclusion of the court is given, tend to make the
decision less authoritative in itself, and less satisfactory to the
profession than it would otherwise have been. The opinion of the
court states that the reasons for its decision "1may he more fully
announced hereafter." This would seem to be desirable on many
accounts. It would remove any doubts there may be in the pro.
fession as to the correctness of the decision. These, if they
exist, affect the consideration and dignity of the court, and anything impairing in any degree the public estimation of that timehonored tribunal would be a public calamity. Then the decision,

